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IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID G. PEARSON and
ELVA P. PEARSON,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v~.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a mmlicipal
corporation, BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SAT,T LAKE
COUNTY and LAMONT B.
GUNDERSEN, EDWI~ Q. CAJ\"NON and ABRAHA:\1 BARKER,
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
COCNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY,

Case No.

9042

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appellants, David G. Pearson and Elva P.
Pearson, will be referred to herein as plainLilfs, and
the respondents, Salt Lake Connty, et al. will be re-ferred to as defendants.
1
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This proceeding originated in the District Court
as an action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The action concern_ed the validity of
Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
1.be said Chapter 7 is described as an act authorizing boards of county commissions to create in
their respective counties improvement districts for
the making of local improvements and the financing
thereof through the levying of special assessments
on benefited property, providing for the collection
and enforcement of such assessments, authorizing the
issuance of warrants and nego.tiable bonds payable
for such assessments, providing for the levy of a tax
on the real property of such districts for the establishment of a guarantee fund to assure the payment of
such bonds, providing for the manner in which
such assessments, taxes and bonds may be contested,
and making certain provisions in connection with
the foregoing, and repealing the improvement district statutes as they are originally set forth in Chapter 7, Title 17 of U.C.A. 1953 <R. 1, 62).
The plaintiffs are residents and owners of real
property located within the boundaries of Special
Improvement District ::'\lo. 1 in Salt Lake County.
Utah, \vhich defendants purport to have created pursuant to Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953 as amended
(R, 2, 62). This District includes property abutting
on the north and south sides of the Murray-Taylorsville Road (48th South) between the west side of

2
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Redwood Road and the east side Gf 11th \.Vest Street
in Salt Lake County, Utah (R_ 12).
Plaintiffs are and ·will be directly affected by the
defendants proceeding under said statute in that they
will become liable for the payment Gf an assessment
to be levied, and the title and interest of the plaintiffs
in their real property within the said lmprovemellt
District will be clouded and adversely affected and
subject to lien and be subject to being proceeded
against for the collection of an assessment (R. 5, 63).
Pursuant to the provisions Gf Chapter 7, Title 17,
C.C.A. 1953, as amended, the Board of Cow1ty Commissioners on February 21, 1958, adopted a resolution
purporting to create Special Improvement District
No. 1 of Salt Lake County for the purpose of making
improvements on the sireets of said district and financing these improvements by a proposed levy
against the real property \vithin said District (R. 1223). Subsequent notices were given (R. 2+-45)
and hearings were held and on April 21, 1958, the
Board of County Commissioners adopted a resolution
specifically setting forth the amounts of the assessments against each piece of property and a finding
that no amounts assessed ·would exceed the bcnefiLs
to be derived by each piece of property from the improvements to be constructed and that no assessment against any piece Gf property would constitute
more than that property's prGper proportionate share
of the total cost of the improvements to be made

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<R. 46-59). Notice of the adoption of this resolution
was adequately given CR. 60, 61).

The improvements to be made in the District
will all be constructed on public property CR. 95l
and will consist of curb and gutters, sidewalks, and
driveways. However, the improvements will not be
uniforrn as to all property within the district. Some
property vvill have curb and gutters, sidewalks, and
driveways; other property will have only curb and
gutter and driveways; other property only curb and
gutter and sidewalk; and other property will have
only curb and gutter (R. 48-48a).
·,Plaintiffs agree that in the creation of the purported Special Improvement District and in their
proceedings to date, the defendants have complied
with the statutory and the State and Federal Constitutions as to notice and hearings CR. 2-3, 62). However, the defendants now propose to invite bids for
construction, award a contract therefor. and upon
final determination of the cost of said improvements, to leYy and collect assessments against each
piece of real property within said District CR. 3-·l,
62).
The plaintiffs contend that the making of the
improvements as contemplated will violate the
Statute itself CR. +-0! and the Utah Sta\f' and Federal Constitutions (R. 4-6). Further, plaintiffs contend that any levy of assessments and of a special
4
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tax as provided and contemplaLed by the sLaLute \Vill
be invalid and uncollectible in thut such provisions
of the Statute violate the Utah State and Federal
Constitutions m. 4-9). Such statutory and constitutional violations are set forth in particular in the
Statement of Points and Argument belmv. Plaintiffs
alsO contend that Lhe statute is void, ineffective und
without force of law in that it is so vague and ambiguous as to be impossible of construction and nse
m. 9) and the particulars in this regard are ~et out
below.
The trial of the issues vvus held vvithout jury on
February 3, 1959 (R. 78) and the court found and
ruled against the contentions of the plaintiffs and
upheld the validity of the statutes and denied injunctive relief (R. 113-122 I.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
I.

Non-unifonnity of Improvements Within Distri~t Makes it Impossible to Determine That Each Piece of Property is Bearing
"Proper Proportionate Shore of Total Cost of Improvement"
as Required by 17-7-13, 14, U.C.A., 1953, as Amended.

II.

Assessment or Tax for Private Driveways Violates Section 5
of Article XIII Utah Constitution in That it is an Assessmenl
or Tax for a Private Purpose.

111.

Special Tax Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A., 1953, as Amended,
in Effect Would Allow Creation of Debt by County in Excess
of Taxes for Current Year in Violation of Section 3, Article
XIV, Utah Constitution.

5
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IV.

Issuance of County Bonds as Provided by 17-7-21, 22, 23,
U.C.A., 1953, os Amended Violates Debt Limitation of Section 4, Article XIV, Utah Constitution.

V.

Speciol Tox Provided by 17-7-26 U.C.A. '19S3, as Amended,
on Real Property Only ViolatE)$ Sections 2 cmd 3, Article XIII,
Utah Constitution which Require "All Tangible Property" to
be Asseued ond Ta>~:ed.

VI.

Special Ta>~: Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A., 1953 as Amended,
Would Be to Pay o Privote Debt in Violation of Section S,
Article XIII, Utah Constitution.

VII.

Special Levy Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A. 19S3, as Amended,
is Without Notice or Heoring in Violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, United States Con$1itution, ond Section 7, Article
I, Utah Constitution.

VIII.

Priority of the Levy of AsseS5ment Provided by 17-7-19,
U.C.A. 1953, os Amended, Is Invalid.

IX.

Chapter 7 Is So Vague ond Uncertain as to Be Inoperative
ond Void.

Point I.
Non-uniformity of Improvements Within District
Mokes it Impossible ta Determine That Each Piece of
Property is Bearing "Proper Proportionate Shore of
Total Cost of Improvement" as Required by 17-7-13
and 14, U.C.A. 1953, crs Amended.

The determination of nearh all of the issues in
this case will turn upon the construction of the various provisions of Chapter 7, Title 17, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended. In construing statutes

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

providing for special or local assessments, they should
be strictly construed in favor of the owners of the
property assessed. The rule in this regard is set forth
.in 48 Am. Jur.-Special and Local Assessments, Section 4, page 567, as follm.,·s:
"The general rule is that statutes providing for special or local assessments are to be
strictly construed and strictly applied in favor
of the O\vner or owners of the property assessed
and against the ass~sing authority."

'

The resolution o£ the Board of County Commissioners contained in Exhibit D of plaintil{s' Complaint, which sets forth the schedule of proposed
assessments shows that the improvements to be constructed as part of the overall improvement project,
are not uniform as to the properties to be assessed.
Some properties are to be improved through the construction of curbs, gutters, side-...valks, and t:lrivev\'ays;
others only through the construction of curbs, gutters, and driveways; others through the construction
of onl.Y curbs, gutters, and sidewalks; and others
through the construction of onl:v curbs and gutters.
Sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 7 of the said Title
17 require that the amount assessed against an ovv:ner's property shall not constitute "more than his
proper proportionate share of the total cost of improvement." Since the improvements are not gOing
to be uniform as to each piece of property assessed,
it becomes impossible accurately to detennine the
7
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prope~

proportionate share of the total cost of the
improvement to be assessed against each property.
Particularly, it becomes impossible to- accurately determine the pro-per proportionate share when allocating costs of the improvements as engineering, legal
fees, inspection, publishing notices, interest on
interim warrants, and other expenses incidental to
the project as are set forth on page 3 of Exhibit ''A"
attached to the plaintiffs' Complaint.
It is apparent that it is not proper to include in
a single assessment program and assessment district
properties which are to be improved with different
kinds of improvements, and the defendants, in attempting to do so, are at the outset, violating the
Statute and making it impossible of application, and
they should be enjoined from proceeding further.
Point II.
Assessment or Tax for Private DrivewaY' Violates
Section 5, Article Xlll, Utgh Constitution in that it is on
Assessment or Tax for a Private Purpose.

The imposition of assessments for driveways for
some properties and not for others as referred to in
Point I a hove amounts to the imposition of an assessment or tax for a private as distinguished from a pub-lic purpose. and it is in contraw'utiou of the constitutiunal requirement that all forms of taxes levied
by a governmental subdivision, including special
8
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assessments, must be levied only for a public purpose.
Section ') of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution
provides as follows:
"The legislatlU'e shull not impose taxes
for the purpose of any county, city, town or
other municipal corporation but may. by law,
vest in the corporate uuthorities thereof, respectively, the pmver to assess and collect
taxes for all purposes of such corporation."
The testimony adduced by Lhe defendants at
the trial on this issue, showed that the benefit to be
derived by the installalion and construction Of Lhe
driveways for some of the private property owners
was mainly for the benefit of such privale pmperty
0\Vners. This is not only in violation of the above
section of the Utah Constitution, it also violates the
generul requirements for the validity of any special
or local assessment. The rule .ii1 this regard is set
forth in 48 Am. Jur.-Local AssNsments, Section 22,
page 'iH2, which states:
"It is necessary to the validity of a special
or local assessment that the improvement for
which il is made be a public, nol a private,
improvement.'-

The Utah court has clearly ruled that the ·words
"for all purposes of such corporation" contained :in
the above Section 5 of Article XIII means that the
power to assess and collect taxes vested in counties
by the Legislature must be exercised only in cormcc9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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•

tion vvith public pm·poses. In the case of Denver and
R.G.R. Co. vs. Grand County, 51 Utah 294, 170 P. 74,
3 A.L.R. 1224, Section 5 of Article XIII was construed and it was there stated:

"The phrase 'for all purposes of such
corporation' is synonymous vvith the phrase
'public purpo~es.' "
In view of the defendants' admission th<it assessments and taxes are to be made and collected for the
construction of private driveways, it seems clear that
such action should be enjoined. Counsel has been unable to find any case that has construed a driveway
leading to private property to be a public purpose.
Further, the consent of the present property owners
involved cannot waive this constitutional provision
so that it would be binding either on the present owners or future owners. It is fundamental that individual property owners cannot vest rights or take
actions that contravene the express prohibitions and
limitations of the Constitution. It would be a strange
and dangerous precedent to provide that just because
a particular group of people at some particular time
consented to the abrogation of constitutional limitations, the Court would countenance and enforce such
arrangement.
Point Ill.
Speciol Tox Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A. 1953,
os Amended, in Effect Would Allow Creation of Debt

10
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by County in Excess of Taxes for Current Year Without
an Election in Violation of Section 3, Article XIV, Utah
Constitution.

Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, provides as
follows:
"'i,Vhenever it shall appear that lhe
special assessments pledged to the paymPnt
of any special improvement bonds issued ~nere
under, have not been or will not be collected
m an amotmt sufficient to assure the yrompl
payment of all principal and interest du,, en
such bonds, the Board of County Commissioners shall levy on all real property within
the issuing improvement district a speda! tax
in an amount sufficient to prevent such default, or if such default shall have occurred,
sufficient to remedy such default."
It is this Section which \vould giYe substance and

worth to the bonds to be sold to finance the projects
of the Improvement District. In fact, without this
provision it is doubtful that the bonds could ever
be marketed. However, it is in direct violation of
Section 3 of Article XIV of the lltah Constitution
which reads as follows:
"1\" o debt in excess of the taxes for the
current year shall be created by any cotrnty or

subdivision thereof, or by any school district
therein, or by any city, town or village, or
any subdivision thereof in this state; unless
the proposition to create such debt, shall have
been submitted to a vote of such qualified
11
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•

electors as shall have paid a property tux
therein, in the year preceding such election,
and a majority of those voting thereon shall
have voted in favor of incurring such debt."

The issuance of bonds supported by this pledge
of the taxing power of the county as provided l?Y said
Section 26 would amount to the creation of a debt.
This is the pledge of anticipated revenue through future taxation by the county. It would amount to the
creation of a debt in excess of cUITent revenues without the necessary election. The a hove referred to provisions of Section 3 of Article XIV are applicable, and
any bonds issued under said Chapter 7 in reliance
upon the credit which the a hove quoted Section
26 of Chapter 7 attempts to allow would be invalid
unless such credit or indebtedness was authorized
by a prior election either throughout the county or
throughout the area within which such taxes are
to be levied as required by this Section of the Utah
Constitution.

The Utah Court has had occasion to apply the
constitutional provisions of the said Section 3 of
Article XIV in a number of different circumstances.
It is noted in reviewing these cases, that the court
has been careful in applying and using the said Section 3 as a strict protection against unauthorized inroads into future taxes \Yithout the approval of the
taxpayer as is required by said Section. The following language is used in the case of Barnes z·s. Lehi
City, 71· Utah 32L HO, 279, P. 878:
12
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"The purpose of this Section and Section 4
is to serve as a limit to taxation and as a protection to taxpayers."
It \\'aS further held in -the casP of 11Joe vs. lVlillard
County School District, "i1 Ctah 144; 179 P. 9RO, ·
that both express and implied contracts in violation
of this provision are null and void. Thi~ 1NOuld
seem to be un ansvver to the contention that if there
is any involvement of the provisions of the said Section 26 of Chapter 7, il is incidental and by implication only inasmuch as there ·would be no reference
to it in the bonds themselves.
A further ruling on this question \Vas made in

the case of Fjeldsted ["S. Ogden Citr, 83 Utah 278, 28
P. 2d 144. which held:
"Necessary improvements mu~t be paid
for either out of rcvcnm.'S within Treasury or
such as may be lawfully anticipated llS revenues of current year, or debt inctuTed for
such im.provements must be authorized by
majority vote of qualified electors as provided
by this section (Senion 3, Article XIV), and
be \Vithi.n constitutional limitations as required by Section 1· of Article XIY, Utah Constitution, or be paid exclusivE'ly out of net
earnings or incomes of property or improvements purchased."
In the very recent case of Srate vs. Spring City, 260
P. 2d ')27, 530, it was held:
13
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•
•

"A municipality cannot, by issuing bonds,
anticipate revenues in future years without
an election. Any holding to the contrary to
the case of Muir vs. Murray City is overruled."
1be judicial· application of the said Section 3 of
Article XIV is fur:ther emphasized in the State vs.
Spring City case wherein the Court stated:
"The constitutional provisions are enacted as a protection for the taxpayers against
an abuse of their credit. The protection is ab-

solute in nature."
The application to permanent improvements of
constitutional provision against a county or municipality exceeding cment revenue io;; discussed in some
detail in 41 A.L.R. 790. The general rule is there
stated as follows:

"A statutory or constitutional clause
\vhich prohibits a municipality from exceeding its revenues is generally held to apply to
expenseS incurred in building or acquiring
permanent improvements. In the absence of
an exception to the restricting provision, they
cannot be acquired at a cost involving an expenditure in excess of the year's revenue,
although the building or improvement in
question may be necessary to the municipalit:r
in carrying out its functions."
It is emphasized that under Chapter -; of Title
17, the bonds that are to be issued are actually the
bonds of the county. Chapter 7 does not E'VC'll pretend
14
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to create any separate corporation, organization, or
entiry, and certainly makes no provision Ior any
separate administrative or policy-forming officers or
body of any kind \Yhatsoever. A careful reading of
all of the sections of Chapter 7 shovvs that throughout it is the county acting through its Board of
County Commissioners. Hence, it is a justiliable conclusion that the bonds \'vhich would be issued and
the debt which is created thereby pursuant to the
above referred provisions of Sec,tion 26 is indebLedness of the county and vvould be :in excess of the
taxes for the current year in violation of Section 3
of Article XIV.
Since the county itself could not constitutionally
create such an indebtedness, it should not be allowed
to incur such indebtedness by circumvention through
a sham entity or special improvement district under
the provisions of Chapter 7, Title 17. Directly in
point is the language of Lhe dissenting opinion in
the recent Utah case of Barlow vs. Clearfield City
Corporation, et al., 1 Utah 2d 419, 26c~, P. 2d 682.
In the Barlow vs. Clearfield case referred to above,
Clearfield City contracted with the VVeber Basin
Water Conservancy Di<>trirt to purchase a quantity
of water and pay for it in annual installments extending over a sixty year period. The City collects
water revenues. It may make its contract payments
to the District for such water from such water revenues, but the City asslUlles no obligation on the part

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

of the contract, and cannot be coerced into making
any payment thereon nor can it be coerced in levying
a tax to enable it to make any payment thereon. If
the City fails to make any part of the contract payment to the District from water revenues or other
sources, then any unpaid balance must be paid
through the collection of a tax levied by the District
on the property \vithin the City. The amount of the
contract obligation was clearly in excess of the constitutional debt limitatioJJ allowed the City. However, the majority of the Court held that this arrangement did not amount to an unconstitutional pledge
of the credit of the City, nor create an indebtedness
of the City because under the contract the City is
not obligated to pay nor could it be coerced into
levying a tax to pay the obligation of the contract.
The dissenting opinion in the Barlow vs. Clearfield case holds that such an arrangement amounts
to the City saying that it will not pledge the future
taxing power of the City, but by contract it will vest
a statulory corporation (the District) with power
to levy a future tax to pay an obligation created by
contract that exceeds the constitutional debt limitation. This dissenting opinion states:
"Everyone agrees that this could not be
done directly bv the citY because of the constitutional debi limit. · The main opinion,
ho\H'VE'r. says such circuit~· of technique satisfies constillltional requirements. I would say
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the constitution has not been satisfied, it has
been circumvented, emasculated, and ignured.
"After this decision, \vhat is to pre\'enl
the Legislature from eliminating constitutional debt limitations altogether by creating
a dmnmy Board, authorized to promise anything under any kind of a proposed project,
and with power to back up that promise witt.
absolute power to tax local citizens, perhaps
against Lheir vdll, without their consent, aud
\YiLhout any opportunity to voice their choice
by sufferage? The answer is that there i~
nothing to prevent it, and \Ve may as well tear
out the pages of the Constitution relaling to
debt limitations on locrll governmental uniLs.
It would seem to the -..Uiter that the main
opinion gives the Legislative branch of government an absolute povver to delete, amend,
modify, recognize or ignore the Constitution
as hereafter it may choose."
It is submitted that the facts of our case herein

not only present a more pointcfl case for the application of the reasoning of the di~senl of the Barlow us.
Clearfield case, but because we here have at least
two clements missing upon vvhich the reasoning or
the majoriLy opinion in the Barlow case \Yas based,
such majority opinion \vill support the contention
that the creation of debts and tl1e pledge of taxing
power allovved by Section 20 of Chapler 7 exceed
the allowable constitutional debt limitation without
an electi011. (1) In the Barlow case, the \Yater Conservancy District \vhich makes the levy, is a separate,
distinct, fully organize~ and officered corporate
17
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entity. As has been previously pointed out above,
Chapter 7 of Title 17 does not provide nor contemplate such a separate, organized, and officered
entity, but its provisions would allow the county and
its Board of County Commissioners through its sham
creation to do what the constitution expressly prohibits it from doing. (2) The provisions of the Section 26 of Chapter 7 make it obligatory that the
"board of county commissioners shall levy on all
real property vvithin the issuing improvement districts a special tax in an amormt sufficient to prevent such default (on bond obligations) or if such
default shall have occurred, sufficient' to remedy such
default." In the Barlow case, as pointed out above,
there is no such obligation on the City in the event
the City does not make the required contract payments.
It is submitted, therefore, that the said Chapter

7, and particularly Section 26 thereof, violates the
debt limitation as provided by Section 3 of Article
XIV of the Utah Constitution.

Point IV.
lssuonce of County Bonds as Provided by 17-721, 22 and 23, U.C.A., 1953, as Amended Violo;lles
Debt Limitation of Section 4 of Article XIV of the Utah
Constitution.

Section ·1· of Article XIY of the Ctah Constitution
reads in part as follows:
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"VVhen authorized to create indebtedness
as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no
county shall become indebted to an amount,
including existing indebtedness, exceeding
two per centum."
As is set forth in detail in the argument on
Point III above, it is the pledge of the county\ credit
and future taxing povver as allmved b~, Section ~(j of
Chapter 7 which flctually makes the bonds to be
issued of worth and marketable. It is contended,
therefore, that not only will there be the creation of
an unauthorized indebtedness by the issuance of the
bonds, but the debt created by such bonds could
well exceed the two per cent debt limitation of Section 4 of Article XIV.
Further, said Chapter 7 is unconstitutional and
void in that said Chapter fails to provide the manner
in which the debt Umitation of 2S{, imposed on counties by Section 4 of Article XIV of the Etah Constitution is to be applicable, and it is impossible to ascertain whether the two per ceilt limitation is to be
computed on the basis of all taxable prope1iy in the
county, or on all taxable property in the improvement district, or on the real property in the improvement district, and it is accordingly impossible
to ascertain \-Vhether bonds issued pursuant to said
Chapter 7 will be issued in violation of such constitutional restriction.
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Point V.
Special Tax Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A., 1953,
as Amended, on Only Real Property Within the District
Violates Sections 2 gnd 3 of Article XIII of the Utah
Constitution which Require "All Tangible Property" to
be Assessed and Taxed.

The pertinent part of Section 2 of Article XIII
reads as follows:

"All tangible property

the state, not
exempt under the laws of the United States.
or under this constitution, shall be taxed ill
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
pr~vided by law."
Hl

The pel·tinent portion of Section 3 of Article
XIII reads as follows:
"The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and
taxation on 'all tangible property' in the state,
according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations as shall secure a

just valuation for taxation of such property,
so that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to the value o£ his, or it<
tangible property."
Since the iPYY provided and allowed by the
said Section 26 of Chapter 7 is a tax, and in fact, is
designated Uy the wording of the Section as ·'a special ta,.," it must comply with the above referred to
constitutional requirements as to assessment and
20
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taxation on "all tangible property." Emphasis is
given to plaintiffs' contention that the levy provided
by the said Section 26 is a tax rather than an assessment in that said Section provides for no notice or
hearing as would be required in the event it \Vas construed to be an assessment. \lore will be said about
this later.
Section 26 in providing for the levy of the special
tax does not even squint at compliance with the above
referred to constitutional requirements. Section 26
provides that when the levy of the special tax o.hall
be made, the board of county commissioners,
"Shall levy on all real property within
the issuing improvement district a special
tax.
"
This tax shall pertain only to real property and
only to real property ·within the District. The Section's own language contemplates violation of the
above constitutional requirements that such levies
must be assessed and taxed against all tangible property and that it must extend at least to all tangible
property within the county.
In an early case, the Ctah Court held that
taxation must be uniform and must be againq all
property \Vithin the confines of Lhe governmental
unit levying the tax. The Court in the case of Continental . Yational Bank of Salt Lake City vs. Naylor,
54 Utah 49, 179 P. 67 stated as follmYs:
21
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"Taxation should be uniform upon all
property within a jurisdiction of authority
levying tax."
I<Urther, the Utah court had this to say concerning the equality and impartialhy o£ a tax in the
case of /\err vs. Woolley, 3 Utah, 456, 24 P. 831:
"Tax law which fails to secure equality
and impartiality of the tax authorized, and
which fails to provide for an adjustment and
equalization of assessments, or guarantees for
the economical, faithful and partial administration of the law, is void."
Point VI.
Special Tax Provided by 17-7-26, U.C.A. 1953, as
Amended, Would be to Pay a Private Debt in Viole~tion
of Section 5, Article XIII, Utclh Constitution.

Section 26 of Chapter 7 provides for a special
tax against non-defaulting landowners \Yithin !fte
District to cover the default of other landowners. The
pertinent language of Section 26 is as follows:
7
""

herever it shall appear that the special assessments pledged to the payment of
any special improvement bonds issued hereunder have not been or will not be collected
in amounts sufficient to assure the prompt payment of all principal and interest due on such
bonds, the board of county commissioners
shall levy on all real property within the
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issuing improvement district a special tax in
an amount sufficient to prevent such default,
or if such default shall have occurred, sufficient to remedy such default."
This is an assessment or tax to pay a private default or debt, and violates Section 5 of Article 13
which has been construed to mean that the taxing
power vested in counties shall be used only for public purposes. Reference is made to the reasoning and
argument set forth under Point II above which is
fully applicable here.
Further, the special tax contemplated by Section 26 violates the provisions of Chapter 7 \vhich provide that the assessment against any piece of land
Vl'ill be only in an amount equal to the benefit to be
derived by the land from the proposed improvement.
This basic principle governing the amount of any
particular assessment is carefully set forth in Sections
13 and 14 of Chapter 7. It is clear, therefore, that
if the landowners who make their payment which
has been arrived at after a determination that such
payment is equal to the benefit conferred on their
land are to be taxed and required to make further
payments to cover the delinquencies of defaulting
landowners in order that the bond obligations ·will
not be in default, then they are, in fact, paying mon'
than what their land will be benefited. This would
not only be a violation of constitutional guarantees
pertaining to equal and uniform rates of taxation
23
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but it would clearly violate the govenring principle
of benefit in detennining the amount of an assessment set forth in Sections 13 and 11· as above indicated. The l:tah Court had occasion to discuss and
rule on a question similar to this in the case of /Velson
vs. Board of Commissioners of Davis County, et al. 62
Utah 218, 218 P. 952. This case concerned an annual
tax levied by an irrigation district to meet the accruing bond obligations. The statutes involved in creating the irrigation district provided that the annual
tax to be levied could include an excess of up to 15%
over its obligations to cover delinquencies. Hm-vever,
there \Vere very substantinl defaults by the landovvners so that the district fell far short of meeting
it~ bond obligations. In the subsequent year, the
Hoard of County Commissioners attempted to levy
a tax \Vhich exceeded the amount necessary to meet
the current year's bond_ obligations and also was
very substantially in excess of the allowable 15% provided by the statute. Non-defaulting property owners within the district brought an action in the
Supreme Court for u writ of prohibition against the
county \\hich \vas granted. The Court stated that
the amount of the tax allowed to be leyjed is controlled by the benefit conferred, and indicated that
it would not even have been possible to assess a tax
fifteen per cent in excess of the benefits conferred if
it had not been expressly provided for by the statutes.
·!be Court used the following language:
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"It would, theref(}re, seem t(} be conclusive that a tax levied against property in an
irrigation district is governed and controlled
by the benefits received by each landm.vner
and for that reason a landuvvncr cannot and
should not be penalized further than is provided in the act for his pro-rata share of delinquencies of other property owners in failing to pay the tax assessed against their property."

It is conceivable that the defaults of landovvners
within the District as contemplated by Section 26
could amount to such a substantial sum that if the
non-defaulting 1and0\vners vvere required to make
good on such defaults, the benefits derived by their
land would be grossly out of balance ·with the total
required payments. This -.vould be destructive of the
theory upon which assessments for improvement
districts arc allmved and -.vhich are spelled out in
detail in the said Sections 13 and 11· of Chapter 7 as
referred to above. Other cases illustrating this point
are: Wayne County Savings Bank vs. Roscommon
Township, 96 Mich. 630, 56 K'V 9++, and lluey vs.
Jackson Parish, 33 L.A. Ann. 1091.
Point VII.
Speciol Levy Provided by 17-7-26 U.C.A., 1953,
os Amended, is Allowed Wilt.out Notice or Hearing in
•

Violation of the "Due Process" Clause of the Fourteentt. Amendment of the United States Constitution
ond Section 7, Article I, Utah Constitution.
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The pertinent part of Section 26 has previously
been set out above and allows for the levy of a special tax to pay bond obligations without making any
provision for any notice and hearing before the levy
of such special tax.
If the special tax to be imposed by the said Section 26 is held to be a special assessment against
real property and not a tax, Section 26 is rmconstitutional because no provision is made therein for notice
and hearing conceming benefits before .the levy is
made, thus violating the "due process of law" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States and Section 7 of Article I of the
Constitution of Utah. This clause and section have
been construed by the Court to prohibit the imposition of special assessments without the giving of due
notice and the holding of a hearing on benefits.
It is respectfully suggested that the defendants

must take a position in regard to the special levy
allmved by Section 26. It is either special tax or an
assessment, and the defendants should not be allowed
to treat it as an assessment to get around constitutional limitations which would apply if it \vere a
tax and then tun1 around and treat it as a tax in
order to get around constitutional limitations which
would apply if it is an assessment.
It is important to note that Sections 12, 13 and
f4. of Chapter 7 recognize the need for and do pro-
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vide a notice and hearing to determine if the individual properties ·will be benefited in the amount
of the original proposed assessment and to see that
each property bears its "proportionate" share. Hmvever, there is no provision for such notice, hearing,
or detennination as to the special levy allowed by
the said Section 26. Since the entire theory behind
the levies that are allowed by Chapter 7 are based
upon and made valid because of the value of the
benefits to be conferred upon the individual land,
then any levy that would be allowed and made
under Section 26 would be in violation of "due process of law."
The rule in regard to the right of notice and
a chance to be heard prior to the making of an
assessment is set forth in 48 Am. Jur.-Special or
Local Assessments, Section 156, page 696. It is there
stated:
" . . . it has been ruled that where the
Legislature of a state does not itself act in
determining an improvement district or area
or in making a special or local assessment,
but delegates the po-.,vcr to do the same to some
subordinate body (which i~ the situation
under our Chapter 7l due process o[ la\V requires that at some stage of Lhe proceedings
before the assessment becomes irrevocably
fixed, the property owner shall have an opportunity to be heard, of \Vhich he must have
notice either personal, by publication, or by
a la>V fixing the time and place of the hear27
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ing. The proceedings in such instance are in
their nature judicial in the sense that such
a right to notice and hearing exists. Under
this rule, it matters not, upon the question of
the colL~titutionality of such a law, that the
assessment has, in fact, been fairly apportioned. The constitutional validity of the law
is to be tested not by what has been done
under it, but by what may, by its authority,
be done . . . . The protective principal that
notice and opportunity to be heard must be
allowed is applicable in all cases where such
rights are essential, whhout reference to the
value of the property sought to be subjected
or Lhe amounL of tax sought to he levied."

The further rule in regard Lo Lhe 1JecessiLy of a notice
and hearing in regard to reassessments or additional
assessments is set forth in 48 Am. Ju.r.-Special or
Local Assessments, Section 159, page 700 wherein it
is stated:

"It has been ruled that a notice of reassessment or additional assessment must be
given."
The C S. Supreme Court CfbE' of Bellingham
Bay and British Columbia Railroad Company l'S. Cit1·
of New Whatcom. 172 U.S. 31-1-. +3 I.. Rd. +fiO, 19 S.
Ct. 205, reaffirms the uece~~ity of some kind of notice
of a reassP~SmPnt. In this cuse there was a reassessment to cover Lhe cost of street improvements after
the first assessment had failed. The case turned upon
the sufficiency of the notice that was giYc>n. but the
case unequivocally stated as follows:
28
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"That notice of reassessment was essential is
not questioned." In support of this rule, the opin:illn
of the Court refers to the case of Davidson vs. iVew
Orleam, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar vs. Reclamation District lVo. 108, 111 L.S. 701; Cooley on Taxation, 266.
The necessity of notice and hearing in connection with an assessment is set forth in Utah case of
Argyle vs. Johnson, 39 Utah 500, 118 P. 487. In this
case it was held that the drainage act there assailed
was fatally defective because iL did not provide an
opportunity for the landowner to be heard before
some competent tribunal on the question ,..,.hether
his lands were benefited by the project, and, if so,
whether the assessments were fair and just prior to
the time when the lien on the lands for delinquent
assessments should become irrevocably established,
or the lands could be sold for delinquent assessments.
In the case of llarmon vs. Rolley, 187 Indiana
511, 120 NE. 3.3, 2 A.L.R. 609, the Court had before
it a statute authorizing special assessments for the
cleaning and repairing of drainage ditches in the
same proportion as the original assessment for the
cost of the construction thereo(, and the Court held
such statute void. The Court there formded its decision on the ground that the statute denied due process of law by failing to provide for notice and a
hearing on the question of actual benefiL to the
landowner.
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The Utah Court had squarely before it this matter of notice and hearing and due process of law in
the very recent case of Bigler vs. Greenwood, 2H P.
2d, 843. In that case, the county had before it a
similar problem of vwrking out an adequate financing arrangement that would give stability and substance to the bonds that were to be issued. The
county wanted the benefits to be derived from a
simple "revenue bond" financing arrangement, and
also the benefits of an assessment financing arrangement which would result in a lien against land, but
they did not provide for the notice and hearing required for assessment financing. Although the
Bigler case involved a sewer district, the financing
arrangement had much the same dilemma that we
find in Section 26.
Section 26 designates the levy a "Special Tax"
but endeavors to give it the status and characteristics of a special assessment. The Court in the Bigler
case refused to let the county ride both ho-rns of this
proposition. The Bigler opinion discusses in some
detail \vhether or not the proposed financing arrangement before them amounts to revenue bonds
or assessment financing. In so doing, they reaffirm
the law as to the necessity of notice and hearing
being necessary for the validity of the assessment. It
is there stated:
''In the latter class of cases (assessment
financing' the law is well established by our
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previous decision that due process of law does
require notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to the imposition of a lien upon one's
poperty."
Further, the Bigler case construed the financing arrangement to be one of an assessment and lien and
uses the following language in its decision:
"If this plan which was obviously designed for the purpose and actually had the
effect of imposing liens upon the property
could be follmved and yet remain classified
as a purely voluntary 'revenue bond' financing program, then the constitutional guarantees of due process of la'\'v and debt limits could
be circumvented while effectively creating
charges upon property. The District should
not be permitted to accomplish by artifice, sub-terfuge, or indirection what the law will not
permit it to do openly and directly."

It is submitted that the above language of the
Bigler case is wholly appropriate to the provisions
of Section 26 \vhich attempt to provide for a special
assessment under a guise of a special tax \vithout
providing or requiring any notice and opporttmity
to be heard and violates the due proce-ss of law clauses
of the federal and state constitutions.
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Point VIII.
The Priority of the Levy of Asses!iltlent os Pro-

vided by 17-7-19 U.C.A. 1953, as Amended, is lnvolid.

Section 1() of Chapter 7 aLtempts to define the
priority given the levy of assessments provided for
Chapter 7 with the following language:

'·Spedal assessments levied hereunder
shall rank on an equality with taxes levied
against the property assessed by the state, the
county and any taxing district thereof and

no sale of property for the non-payment of
taxes or other special assessment shall extinguish the lien of other than the taxes or
special assessments for the non-payment of
vvhich such sale is made .... The lien of special assessments levied hereunder shall be
superior to all other liens against the property
assessed except that it shall be on a parity -.,vith
the lien of ad valorem taxes and the lien of
other special assessments and shall be effective from and after the date upon which the
notice of levy is published."
The above pt·uv isions of Section 19, Chapter 7
pertaining to the rank or parit:\· of assessments made
thereunder is vague and uncertain and impossible
of application and use in that it i~ impossible to
delf'l'mine therefrom t1IP nmk or parity of such
assessments. It attempts to give such levies the same
rank as general taxes, but since general taxes have
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a rank depending on the year of their levy, this
reference to the rank of general taxes is of no use _
in determining rank or parity. Further, since the
rank of such assessment determines whether the
statute will be workable or not and whether the
bonds will be marketable when issued, this ambiguity and uncertainty renders the statute invalid.
Further reference to the question of the ambiguity
and uncertainty of this statute "\-Vill be made in Point
IX below.
The priority which is attempted to be given the
levy of assessments provided by Chapter 7 is also
inconsistent with and contrary to the provisions of
59-10-3 e.C.A. 1953, which defines the nature and
extent of liens created by every tax upon real property. 1bis statute reads as follows:
"Every tax upon real property is a lien
against the property assessed; and every tax
due upon improvements upon real estate
assessed to others than the owners of the real
estate is a lien upon the land and improvements; which several liens attach as of the
first day in January of each year."
1be Utah Court hns had occasion to clearly rule on
the superiority of the lien of general tnxes under
the above referred to statute. In the case of Robinson
vs. Hanson, 75 Ltah 30, 282 P. 782, the Court
held:
"Under this Section, taxes for general
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goverrnnental purposes are paramonnt to all
other demands against the taxpayer, although
the statute :imposing the tax does not expressly
declare such a priority. Accordingly, it is
superior to tax levied by drainage district."
The general rule as to the priority of the various types of tax liens is set out in 31 Am. Jur._:__
Taxation, Section 1017, page 888 as follows:
"Most courts hold, however, that when
taxes against a particular piece of property oron land are made a lien on such property or
land, the tax lien will have priority over all
other liens against that particular property in
question, whether attaching before or after
the tax lien., even though the statute does n(}t
in express terms make the tax lien a first or
prior lien.
"The broad general rule has been stated
to be that liens of general taxes are superior to
other liens, unless the legislature has clearly
declared the contrary."
Our Legislature has spoken on this matter as is
set out in 59-10-3 U.C.A. 1933, as amended, and
quoted in full above, and our Courts have interpreted
this Section to mean that the lien for general taxes
is prior to the lien for any special improvements.
Such a holding is consistent with the theory that general taxes represent a claim for the necessary support
for the government and such a claim is a higher
obligation than the demands for the cost of local
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improvements, even though the latter have quasipublic features. The Utah ca~e of Western Beverage
Company of Provo, Utah vs. Hanson, 96 P. 2d 1105,
sets down this rule in regard to a conflict in statutes
pertaining to the lien of a general tax and a lien
for special assessments:
"In the case of a conflict between Section
of revised statute relating to general tax lien
and another relating to lien for special assessments, requiring one section to yield to the
other, the section relating to the general tax
which supports governmental functions must
prevail. The sale of property by the county for
general taxes initiated a new unencumbered
title from a sGverign state and extinguished
lien of city for special improvement assessments, Legislative intention being to make all
liens other than liens for general taxes subject
to lien for general taxes \Yhich should persist
until payment of general taxes."
Reference is made to an annotation appearing
at 11 A.L.R. 2d 1133 concerning the priority of
liens for general taxes and special assessments. It is
there stated as follows:
"It has been stated as a general principle

that the lien of a special assessment is subordinate to a lien for general tax«s and is
extinguished by sale of the land to satisfy the
general Lax lien."
This same annotation refers to a number of cases
in support of this proposition. The following lan35
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guage is taken from the case of Pennsylvania Company vs. Tacoma, 36 Wash. 656, 79 P. 306:
''\·Ve have so often decided that the lien
·for general taxes is paramount to all other
claims and liens, including the lien of assessments for local improvements, that the question is no longer an open one in this Court.''
H would appear from the above authorities and

many more that could be cited that the attempt of
Section 19 of Chapter 7 to give the levy of assessments provided by Chapter 7 equal priority V\'ith the
lien of general Laxes must fail and the sHme should
be declared invalid.
Point IX.
Chgpler 7 is so Vggue Gnd Uncertoin gs to be
lnoperotive gnd Void.

The plaintiffs preface their argument with the
follmving rule concerning the necessit)- for certainty
and clearness in a statute set forth in 50 Am. Jur.Statutes, Section 472, page 484:
"In the enactment of statutes reasonable
precision is required. Indeed, one of the prime
requisites of any statute i~ certainty, and legislative enactment may be declared by the
courts to be inoperative and void for uncertainty in the meaning thereof."
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Reference is made to all of the foregoing points
relied upon, and the arguments made in connection
therewith as ample evidence that Chapter 7 is so
ambiguous and uncertain as to be impossible of
construction and use. It is impossible to determine
from Chapter 7 what type of entity the statute attempts to create to act in carrying out the provisions
of the statute. It is impossible to ascertain whether
the bonds to be issued are intended to be bonds of a
county or a district. It is impossible to ascertain
whether the taxes to be levied thereunder arc county
or district taxes. It is impossible to ascertain whether
such levies amonnt to a general or special tax or an
assessment for local improvements.
\Vhile the Chapter purports to create an Improvement district, no where is there any provision
or requirement for the creation of a separate corporation or entity nor is there auy provision or requirement for such a separate entity to have officers, directors or particular employees of any kind. Rather, the
provisions of Chapter 7 call for the county or the
county acting through its Board of County Commissioners to fonnulate all policies and perform all
acts that are required to carry out the provisions o(
the Chapter. It is the Board of County Commissioners
\'vhich issues the bonds. They are designated as bonds
of the Board of County Commissioners.
It is imperative to the validity of such a statute
37
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•

as this to have these questions defiiled with certainty
because of the different rights and obligations which
\vill follow from the entity and the status and relationship that v.ill be created by the Statute. If,
under the Statute, it is deemed that it is the county
which acts in carrying out and implementing the
Statute, it will have different power and authority
than if it is deemed that the statute intends to create
a separate district or other entity to act. If the acting
party is the county, it has certain constitutional limitations pertaining to the creation of debt or the
pledging of its taxing powers. If the acting party
is the district or some other entity, then it may not
tax, but have latitude in the creation of debt. These
and other differences have been described in detail
in the other Points Relied Upon set out above.
The following is an additional statement of the
law concerning the requisite definiteness and certainty required of the statute set forth in 50 Am. Jur.
-Statutes, Section 472, page 48+-485 and it refers
to when the power of a court may be exercised to
declare a statute inoperative and void for uncertainty:
"This power may be exeicised when the
statute is so incomplete, or so irreconcilably
conflicting or indefinite, that the statute cannot be executed and the court is unable by the
application of known and accepted rules of
construction to determine vvhat the Legisla-
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ture intended with any reasonable degree of
certainty."
In this same American Jurisprudence section on
page 486 in a further elaboration as to the certainty
necessary for the validity of a statute it is stated:
"In order that a statute may be held
valid, the duty imposed by it must be prescribed in terms definite enough to serve as a
guide to those who have a duty imposed upon
them. Indeed, where the meaning of a statute
cannot be judicially ascertained, the Courts
are not at liberty to supply the sufficiency or
undertake to make the statute definite and
certain. In determining whether a statute is
void for uncertainty, the statute should be
considered as a whole."
The purpose of Chapter 7 is to prGvide a means
whereby sorely needed improvements can be made
in many places in several counties CJ.f the state.
Plaintiffs do not quarrel vvith the vvorthvvhile objectives of the Statute. However, there must be provided a workable definitive statute that is framed
within constitutional requirements and limitations
to accomplish these objectives. To proceed under a
statute that is no-t so- framed would have fatal ramifications and numerous disastrous pitfalls which vvould
defeat rather than accomplish the purposes hoped
for under the Statute.
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CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that Chapter 7, Title
17, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, is unconstitutional and
invalid in its entirety and in the particulars set
f-orth in the Points III through IX inclusive above,
and, further, that the proposed actions of the defendants nnder the provisions of said Chapter 7 as
outlined in Point I and II above arc in violation of
the provisions of the chapter itself and of the Utah
Constitution.

-

For the foregoing
. reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Trial Court should
be disaffirmed and reversed vvith _instructions to the
Court to enter judgment as follows;
1. Chapter 7, Title 17 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, is unconstitutional and invalid

in its entirety.
2. The lack of uniformity as to the kind of
improvements to be made in connection with each
piece of property within the improvement district
violates the Statute and makes it impossible of application and use.
3. The construction of private driveways as
contemplated by the defendants and the Special
Improvement District No. 1 of Salt Lake County
would violate Section 5 of Article XIII of the Uah
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Constitution, and this violation 'vould not be cured
hy the written request and consent of the properly
owners in the Improvement District.

+.

Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, violates Section 3 of Article XIV
of the Utah Constitution, and is rmconstitutional,
void, ineffective and 'vithout force of law.
5. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.\.,
1953, as amended, violates Section 4 of Article XIV
of the Utah Constitution, and is unconstitutional,
void, ineffective and vdthout force of law.

'

6. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, LC.A ..
19·i3, as amended, violates Section ·j of Article XIII
of the L'tah Constitution. and is unconstitutional,
void, ineffective and without force of lavv.
7. Section 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended, violates the }ourtcenth Amendment of the L niled States Constitution, and is unconstitutional, void, ineffective and 'vithout force
of law.

8. Sf'clion 26 of Chapter 7, Title 17, l".C.A.,
1953, as amemled; violates Section 7 of Article I of
the Utah Constitution and is unconstitutional, void
ineffective aml vdthout force of Ia-.,v.
9. Section 26 of Chapter 7. Title 17. lJ.C ...\.,
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•
19'53, as aniended, violates Section 2 of Article XIII
of the Utah Cori.Stilution, and- is urtconstitutiOnal
.
'
void, irieffective~ and without force of law. l'•

a',.

'···

--:;;,.

'

10. Sectio-n 26 of Chapter 7,
1953, as amended, violates Section
of the rtah Constitution,~ and is
void, ineffective and without force

-n~;_

Title ,-17, U.C.A.,
3 of Article XIII
uTtcOhStitutional,
of law.

11. Section '19 of Chapter 7, Title 17, C.C.A.,
1953, as amended, is incom;i.;;tcnt -with and would
violate 59-10-3 U.C.A., 1953, and is contrary to the
rule of la\v thai: taxes for general governmental
purposes are paramount to all other demands against
the taxpayer, although the statute imposing the tax
doE;s not expressly declare such priority, and is invalid and without force of law.
12. Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended, is so vague and ambiguous as to be impossible of construction and use and is, therefore,
void, ineffective, and without force of law.
13. 1be defendants, and each of them, their
agents, and servants, are permanently restrained
and enjoined from proceeding or taking any actions
under and pursuant to Chapter i. Title 17. U.C.A.,
1953, as amended.
t+. The plaintiffs are not required to comply
with and shall not be bound and their property in
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said District shall not, be aff~cted by any actions,
proceedings, or levy of as~e.ssments . that may be
taken or made .by. the defendants, their agents and
servants, pursuant to Chapter 7, Title 17, U.C.A.,
1953, as amended.

15. The plaintiffs to have and recover their
costs.
Respectfully submitted,
Lyle M. Ward
of OWEN & WARD
Cotmsel for the Plaintiffs and
Appellants
141 East Second SOuth Street
Salt Lake City: Utah
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